Although the danger posed by non-traditional groups justifies the accordance of priority by law enforcement, there is a catch: diversion of substantial resources to their suppression permits traditional organized crime to rebound. With law enforcement resources spread thin to contend with terrorism, private-sector white-collar crime and official corruption, we may see a vicious cycle where the deployment of scarce and expensive resources against some criminal groups simply provides expansion opportunities for others. The dilemma for law enforcement is how to allocate limited resources against the more mistake-prone organized criminals, both traditional and nontraditional, while still focusing the bulk of society’s counter-racketeering efforts upon the more sagacious, cunning and ruthless syndicates.

 Seven LCN organizations – typically called the Genovese, Gambino, Lucchese, DeCavalcante, Bruno, Bonanno and Colombo groups after their most significant historical bosses – function in New Jersey with varying degrees of success. State Police Captain Robert J. Cicchino, Chief of the Narcotics and Organized Crime Bureau, testified at the Commission’s public hearing that “the more resourceful groups are consolidating their power and becoming even stronger, whereas the less resourceful, the unlucky and sometimes just the sloppy individuals [are] getting arrested and leaving other areas of opportunity open for the stronger groups to move in.” Ciccino ranked the most powerful LCN groups operating in New Jersey:
In particular, … the Genovese crime family is extremely strong. We’re seeing Bonanno crime family [and] the Gambino crime family are very strong. The other families, because of what has occurred over the past several years with litigation against them, with their arrests, with their prosecutions [are] tending to fall by the wayside.

Mark W. Rufolo, Chief of the New Jersey U.S. Attorney’s Strike Force (Organized Crime) Division, testified at the public hearing about the durability of traditional organized crime:
… [I]f we give in to the temptation of believing that we have conquered La Cosa Nostra in the State of New Jersey, we will find ourselves back at square one before too long … . The structure and hierarchy of organized crime have enabled it to survive for over 70 years. And we have made great strides over the past 15 to 20 years. But because of that structure and hierarchy, the rules of protocol, the discipline, they have an ability to regenerate. They’re a very resourceful organization. And because they’re involved in so many different types of activities and because they are as opportunistic as they have proven themselves to be, we must continue the effort.

 At the public hearing, FBI Supervisory Special Agent James E. Furry, Organized Crime Program Coordinator for the Newark Division, described how prosecutions can result in cycles of decimation and regeneration in the ranks of traditional organized crime groups:
… [A] top-echelon organized crime source … told me that when they go away to prison, they call that “going to college” because they go and they meet with their buddies [and] people from other crime families, and they learn the latest scams, the latest frauds, the latest kinds of things … going on in the criminal world. So when they’re released, they're actually better prepared to go out and be criminals … . The important thing … is that … while they’re in prison, [their organizations] are replenishing their ranks. When older members die, … they “open the books,” … refill the ranks by bringing new people in. And there’s no … lack of individuals who wish to become part of the LCN or the Mafia. So … I don’t think we have any kind of weakening. It’s a cyclical thing, and they’re probably in the process of regenerating.

James Vanderberg, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Newark Office of Labor Racketeering and Fraud Investigations, U.S. Department of Labor, testified that nationally and in New Jersey, the LCN’s presence in labor unions is “still strong.” He contended that union racketeering income for the LCN “hasn’t dissipated at all.” Union schemes have the potential to affect adversely the approximately 800,000 union members in New Jersey. Companies are shaken down for labor peace at job sites. Ineligible individuals obtain coverage under union health-care plans. Organized crime-controlled administrators of employee pension and benefit funds arrange for “kickbacks in every imaginable administrative cost,” according to Mr. Vanderberg. He added, “Wherever  there is a way of using that money, they’re going to find a way to put somebody in place to take it. … I don’t think it’s something that’s going to go away.”

Those traditional organized crime groups that have adapted to take advantage of new criminal opportunities, to insulate themselves from crime fighters, and to cooperate with non-traditional crime organizations have remained powerful threats to society. They have become more involved in and skilled at fraud, including identity theft, health-care fraud, computer crime, motor-fuel tax evasion and securities manipulation, as well as money laundering and new forms of gambling. Meanwhile, labor racketeering, including pension and benefit fund schemes, such as kickbacks, self-serving investments and padding of costs; numbers running; illegal sports betting; loan sharking; extortion; narcotics trafficking; and prostitution continue, occasionally disrupted but generally unabated. Public construction contracts also remain vulnerable to mob infiltration. Through extortion, bid-rigging and other means, elements of La Cosa Nostra circumvent and undermine legitimate procurement practices. They exploit weak contractor pre- qualification rules and take advantage of vague standards governing contractor integrity and performance – all in the service of seizing control of public-works contracts across the New York/New Jersey metropolitan region. The Genovese, DeCavalcante, Bonnano and Lucchese LCN groups have been, individually and in concert, especially active in this insidious subversion of the public’s interest. In essence, too many criminal opportunities exist – some fueled by never-ending demand for vice gratification and some inspired by victim vulnerability – and too many underworld denizens, eager for entry, are banging on the clubhouse door, making it difficult for society to gain the upper hand on LCN groups for very long.

 From the FBI’s point of view, Mr. Furry noted that the LCN’s traditional New Jersey strongholds persist. The Genovese family concentrates its activities in Bergen and Hudson counties. The Gambino group operates throughout the state, focusing on particular industries such as the waterfront and waste management, according to Mr. Furry. He said the DeCavalcante family, New Jersey’s only “home-grown” LCN organization, operates in Essex and Monmouth counties, but Union County is its stronghold. The Bruno family operates in southern New Jersey with at least one gambling operation in the North.

State Police Captain Cicchino testified that a significant number of LCN soldiers and associates are in prison, but, despite media hype to the contrary, their numerical strength remains comparable to what it was a dozen years ago. By and large, positions in the hierarchy, as well as in soldier and associate ranks, remain filled. He testified that the Genovese family is “migrating down to Monmouth and Ocean counties.” He noted that the State Police, using a comparative threat ranking based on a formula developed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, conclude that the Genovese crime family is the strongest and most active in New Jersey, with the most varied activity and the most contact with non-traditional organized criminals.

Captain Cicchino called the LCN in general “very actively involved in the [solid] waste industry,” especially “the unregulated demolition and recycling industries where nobody is looking at them and [they have] an opportunity for tremendous profits.” He noted, “It creates problems with possible hazardous waste being dumped, things of that nature.” Mr. Furry testified that LCN makes “a lot of money” mixing polluted material  with demolition material and brokering deals to have it dumped cheaply in New Jersey, Pennsylvania or elsewhere.

Assistant Attorney General David V. Brody, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Bureau in New Jersey’s Division of Criminal Justice, testified that after broad prosecution of customer allocation schemes enforced by organized crime in the solid waste collection industry during the early 1980s:
… a lot of people thought maybe at that time that that was going to eliminate organized crime from the carting industry, but obviously it didn’t. They maintained control over a lot of smaller companies. And going into the mid and late 90s, there were still some of those companies that were being influenced and controlled … . And we had indictments as recently as 1997 involving some of the same players from [the earlier case]. So … we have seen that they’re still involved. … [S]ome of the larger [publicly-traded] companies … took over … a lot of those smaller companies and are not as involved. But some of the smaller companies were still involved. … I think we’ve … [made] … a huge dent into organized crime’s involvement in the industry. But … wherever the opportunity presents itself, [they try] to get involved with … some of the companies that … still have that kind of ownership. But I think we’ve been very successful.

The Commission traced the history of so-called “property rights” schemes in the solid waste collection industry in its 1989 Solid Waste Regulation report. With enforcement assistance from organized criminals, associations made up of waste haulers conspired to treat their customers as property belonging to those firms accustomed to collecting their trash. This collusive practice extended to municipal customers victimized by bid-rigging. As recommended by the Commission, legislation was adopted abolishing an ineffective and costly system of utility-style rate regulation in the solid waste  collection industry. This encouraged fresh competition, especially from publicly traded national and international firms, and helped to change the industry to one less accommodating for property rights schemes. The Commission also spurred greater attention to background investigations as a way to keep nefarious elements out of the solid and hazardous waste collection and disposal industries.

As opportunities for organized crime have faded in industries such as solid waste, criminal groups have sought new opportunities in other industries. Mr. Rufolo testified, “[M]ore recently we believe [LCN] may be involved with Eastern European groups in the health-care industry and also in the asbestos industry.” He called the LCN “opportunistic” and noted that it got involved with the stock boom in the late 1990s. He concluded, “[T]hey’ll get involved in the next thing that provides an opportunity for profit through criminal means.”

Expanding on the LCN’s connection to non-traditional organized crime, Captain Cicchino likened it to “a subcontractor/contractor type relationship.” He added:
Whatever the non-traditional groups [can’t] provide, LCN will provide to them and vice versa. LCN has the established infrastructure, which allows the non-traditional groups access to certain areas, and as a result, that increases their profits by dealing with LCN. If LCN is subcontracting things like extortion, murder, importing narcotics through the non-traditional groups, it’s the best for both sides. The non-traditional group has an avenue where they can generate revenue by supplying LCN, and LCN has the access to the resources that they wouldn’t otherwise have.

Mr. Rufolo agreed, testifying, “[W]e’ve seen more sharing than turf wars between the groups.” Mr. Furry added that he has seen instances where LCN has tried to shroud its  criminal activity by reaching out to Eurasians to extort someone or to commit a murder for them “and vice versa.”

Mr. Rufolo distinguished the Sicilian Mafia from LCN:
The Sicilian Mafia is fairly distinct from LCN in that LCN is an American Mafia, existing in the New York/New Jersey area, of seven families …. The Sicilians have more direct ties over to Italy and Sicily. Traditionally and historically, we’ve seen Sicilians involved with various of the families here in the New York/New Jersey area, particularly historically with the Gambinos and the Bonannos. The [clearest] example of that, of course, was the Pizza Connection case back in the mid-to-late 1980s. Since then … law enforcement has been monitoring various persons believed to have Sicilian Mafia connections. We have not uncovered specific instances of criminal conduct really by a Sicilian group in recent years.

We have seen the Sicilians involved also with the DeCavalcantes, who have ties back to Sicily and the Bruno [family]. John Stanfa, in particular, who was prosecuted in the late 1990s as the boss of the Bruno family, had ties back to Sicily, and had persons working for him in part of his crew within the Bruno family who were directly brought by him from Sicily. So we’ve seen that kind of involvement between the Sicilians and La Cosa Nostra.

Most recently, according to a high-ranking Sicilian organized crime figure, who is presently cooperating with law enforcement authorities over in Italy, … some American … made members of La Cosa Nostra have been brought over to Sicily to be schooled in the ways of the Sicilian Mafia, because there is a perception … that the American LCN members have lost certain values of respect and honor that were traditionally part of La Cosa Nostra and the Sicilian mob. I don’t know that specific instances of that have been corroborated yet. This is fairly recent information. But you can go back to electronic interceptions of John Stanfa, who talked about this very point, that he was concerned that there weren’t enough young people in America to recruit into La Cosa Nostra who had the same values and qualifications to be members of La Cosa Nostra. And that’s why he  brought some of his own crew members directly over from Sicily. So I think it's something that has to be … monitored as a potential threat. …