Rich and powerful transnational drug trafficking organizations make sure that
sufficient quantities of illegal drugs are available to meet the demand in New Jersey and
elsewhere. Accepting that certain quantities of contraband, and the lower-rung people
delivering it, are expendable, the leaders of large drug trafficking networks matter-offactly
write off such losses while netting huge profits and great power. Often, these
leaders never enter the United States, and they further insulate themselves from law
enforcement scrutiny by concealing their illicit activities within legitimate enterprises
operating as fronts. They also directly conduct their illegal businesses only with a limited
number of trusted associates, and even those underlings may be kept in the dark about
large segments of the illegal operations. Finally, the leaders learn from their
organizations’ mistakes just as legitimate entrepreneurs do, and they adapt quite
successfully, at least in the short term, to changing market conditions and to law
enforcement’s interdiction efforts. When a particular group’s long-term success is
disrupted by internecine warfare, rivalries with other groups or government crackdowns,
including environmentally risky defoliation projects, other groups based in other locales
are capable of carrying on the trade without any significant slackening of supply.
The DEA’s Alexander Gourley pointed to characteristics of New Jersey that make
it a particularly attractive destination for drug smugglers. He cited the state’s established
abuser population, its proximity to major East Coast population centers and its extensive
transportation infrastructure. He noted, “Drug traffickers exploit the sheer volume of
passengers and cargo transported via this infrastructure to conceal their drug smuggling
activities.” Mr. Gourley also maintained that criminal organizations “take advantage of
the ethnic diversity of New Jersey to facilitate their drug trafficking activities.” He
testified:
These organizations and criminal groups commonly locate operatives in
communities where they share a common culture and language so they may blend
easily and disguise their activities. This tactic is used not only in the metropolitan
areas with diverse populations, but also in rural areas with large numbers of
migrant workers.
Martin D. Ficke, Associate Special Agent in Charge of the Newark Office of the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, testified at the Commission’s public hearing that drug contraband crosses into
New Jersey via several international boundaries, including Newark Liberty International
Airport, the Ports of Newark and Elizabeth and other venues at Perth Amboy, Atlantic
City, Salem, Camden, and Teterboro Airport. Much of the narcotics smuggled into or
through New Jersey winds up in the hands of New Jersey users, according to Mr. Ficke.
He testified that “about a quarter of all of the [millions of] passengers that are traveling
into Newark Liberty Airport are traveling internationally.” He added that with the
expansion of Terminal C at Newark Liberty it is anticipated that over the next few years
international traffic there “could increase by up to 33 percent.”
Mr. Ficke noted that drug contraband transport techniques “continue to evolve.”
He cited encounters with concealed narcotics in false-sided suitcases, body girdles, vests,
seat containers, express-mail deliveries, and drug-filled balloons or condoms swallowed
by couriers. “One particularly troubling case,” he testified, “involved 13 recent graduates
of Memorial High School in West New York” smuggling an estimated 12 pounds of
swallowed heroin into the United States. He described a particularly ingenious method
used by determined and well-financed traffickers that is “extremely difficult to detect”:
the smuggling of heroin saturated in clothing. In this scheme, Ficke said, the drug is
placed in liquid form, soaked into the cloth, dried, transported and then recovered through
a chemical extraction process once in the United States.
Mr. Ficke related the difficulty presented when airport employees are corrupted to
assist the traffickers:
Internal conspiracies or smuggling by airport employees continues to be a
problem at Newark Liberty Airport. During [2002] and continuing to [April
2003], 78 pounds of narcotics were seized at that facility, being smuggled by
employees of that facility. And it should be noted that one particular person who
was arrested admitted to smuggling approximately 1,000 kilo[gram]s through
Newark Liberty and JFK Airport using the internal conspiracy method.
Mr. Ficke described the elaborate and expensive lengths to which drug contraband
smugglers will go to develop so-called “front” organizations and other methods to foil
officials’ interception efforts:
We’ve had multiple cases of organizations that established companies in
the United States strictly to import narcotics into the United States. We have had
multiple cases where they have brought in legitimate imports to basically
determine to what extent they were being scrutinized by federal law enforcement
as their containers crossed and were entering through the port of entry.
…[W]hen they feel comfortable … [and] have established what they believe to be
a clean importation record, … at that point they'll load up the container and
bring in the narcotics. …[T]here’s a tremendous amount of money involved here,
and they have tremendous assets …to come in and set up … a shell company,
with workers in a warehouse in Newark or Elizabeth, to bring in some imports
with … a legitimate business … [without knowing if they will] make any money
… . But … the goal here is not to make money off of that. It’s ultimately to
establish a clean record in the United States with Customs [Enforcement] so they
can load up and bring in [a] container [with narcotics].
… [W]e even had a situation where they photographed the contents of the
container when they loaded it overseas. They videotaped it. And they videotaped
it when it arrived back here to see if Customs had been in there to examine it.
They were actually sticking probes into our inspector’s drill holes to find out how
far we would drill into a cylinder of paper. And then ultimately what they did is
they constructed compartments that they thought were deeper than the actual drill
bit. … Also, we’ve had some history of them actually infiltrating Customs brokers,
who are the people who are … legitimately involved in getting cargo on the pier
and through Customs.
Otherwise divergent drug trafficking groups often combine their resources in
order to foil interdiction efforts. When United States and Colombian officials achieved
some success in foiling notorious 1980s-era Colombian cocaine cartels, their successors
formed alliances with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. NDIC Director Horn
testified regarding the significant extent of such partnerships:
You’re finding more Mexican involvement actually taking loads from the
West Coast here to the East Coast than has ever been seen before. You also have
certainly a great deal of cooperation among Mexican, Colombian and Dominican
drug traffickers, as well as Israeli and Russian drug trafficking organizations. So
there is kind of a homogenous group one way or another and they share expertise
and … best practices.
Mr. Horn emphasized the difficulty of hiring drug trafficking control personnel
with adequate language capabilities:
… [A]t NDIC, we’re trying to recruit intelligence analysts with language
abilities, and it’s really a full market for those kinds of talents. We’re competing
with [Homeland Security and DEA], as well as a half dozen other … agencies
that are looking for the same type of quality analysts who may have language
abilities, especially some of the more obscure languages these days, like Arabic
or Farsi or Fustu. Obviously, in the United States, there’s simply not enough of
that talent around to meet all of our needs.
Mr. Horn described the wholesale distribution of major narcotics once they have
entered New Jersey from various source countries via air, land and sea conveyances:
…Columbian drug trafficking organizations and criminal groups and
Dominican criminal groups are the primary wholesale-level cocaine and South
American heroin distributors in New Jersey. Nigerian and other West African
criminal groups are the dominant wholesale-level distributors of Southeast Asian
heroin. Lebanese, Pakistani, Nigerian, and other criminal groups distribute
wholesale quantities of Southwest Asian heroin in the state. Jamaican and
Mexican criminal groups are dominant marijuana distributors in New Jersey.
And Israeli and Russian criminal groups are the dominant wholesale-level
MDMA distributors. Further, outlaw motorcycle gangs such as the Pagans and
Warlocks are the primary wholesale distributors of methamphetamine. These
criminal groups frequently control cut houses, storefronts, and open-air drug
markets in Camden, Newark and Trenton, as well as in other areas of the state.